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iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section
78-2-2(3) of Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
A.

Whether the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for

Summary Judgment and in deciding as a matter of law that the Labor Contract
allows an arbitration on the question of whether Plaintiff Jolley was terminated
"based on [her] abilities, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform work",
when the Plaintiffs did not comply with the Labor Contract by filing an Article 13
grievance to arbitrate that question. (Tr. at 16-17.)
B.

Whether the trial court's decision to allow an arbitrator to determine

whether Jolley was terminated "based on [her] abilities, competency, fitness, and
qualifications to perform work", is inconsistent with Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah
Arbitration Act. (Tr. at 18.)
C.

Whether the trial court erred by granting Plaintiffs' Motion for

Summary Judgment in the face of genuine issues of material fact on the only
arbitrability question properly presented to that court. (Utah Transit Authority's
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6,
8-13.)
D.

Whether the trial court erred by failing to rule that Article 7 of the

Labor Contract unambiguously precludes arbitration of any termination of a

1

probationary employee. (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3-8.)
Alternatively, whether the trial court erred by granting the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment when UTA offered, at a minimum, another
reasonable interpretation of Article 7. (E.g., Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-8; Reply Memorandum in Support
of Utah Transit Authority's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-4 (UTA arguing
that its interpretation of Article 7 is clear and unambiguous.) UTA preserved this
alternate issue by arguing on brief and at hearing, that Article 7 unambiguously
excluded terminations of probationary employees from the arbitration process. In
doing so, UTA in effect argued that its interpretation is more than reasonable and
prevents summary judgment for the Plaintiffs. Appellate courts recognize that
parties cross-moving for summary judgment on a contract interpretation matter
implicitly contend that they are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but that if
the court determines otherwise, factual disputes exist which preclude judgment as
a matter of law in favor of the other side". E.g., Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780
P.2d 821, 824-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Naturally then, cross-movants for
summary judgment arguing that a contract is unambiguous under their respective
interpretations implicitly argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, but if the court denies one of those motions, the denied movant presented a
interpretation that creates an ambiguity, precluding judgment as a matter of law in
favor of the opposing movant.

2

Standard of Review: Because those issues flow from the trial court's granting or
denial of summary judgment, this Court should review each issue "for correctness,
according no deference to its legal conclusions". Ralph L. Wads worth Constr., Inc. v.
West Jordan City, 999 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). "Summary judgment is
appropriate only where no genuine issues of material fact exist and where the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law". Id. Therefore, in reviewing issue (C),
the Court "view[s] the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the losing party".
Fashion Place Inv., Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
see also Frisbee v. K & K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984) (summary
judgment is proper when "there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against
could prevail").
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-4:
Court order to arbitrate.
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration
agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the
agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration
accordingly.
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement is
involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear
motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that court. Otherwise, the
motion shall be made to a court with proper venue.
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or proceeding
involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. However, if the issue is
severable from the other issues in the action or proceeding, only the issue subject to
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arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made in an action or proceeding, the order for
arbitration shall include a stay of the action or proceeding.
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim that an
issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim have not
been shown.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment, titled Summary Judgment and Order to

Arbitrate, entered in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
by the Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson, on September 5, 2002. (Addendum A.)
B,

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
On or about December 15, 2000, the Plaintiffs filed with the Third Judicial

District a Complaint to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Jolley's termination of
employment with Defendant Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"). In the Complaint,
the Plaintiffs requested that the Third Judicial District Court ("Trial Court") order
arbitration of both Jolley's termination and the parties' disagreement regarding the
interpretation of Article 7 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Utah
Transit Authority and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 ("Labor Contract").
(Complaint to Compel Arbitration ("Compl.") at U 16, B.) In May, 2002, the
Plaintiffs and UTA filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 20,
2002, the trial court heard argument on the Plaintiffs' and UTA's motions for
summary judgment. On September 5, 2002, the Trial Court entered an order
granting plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and requiring the parties to
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arbitrate the question of "[w]hether or not the termination of employment of
Caroline Jolley-Christensen by the Utah Transit Authority (UTA) was based on
her abilities, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform work".
(September 5, 2002, Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate ("Order") at 2.)
Further, the Trial Court ordered that, if the arbitrator found that Jolley "was
terminated for reasons other than her ability, competency, fitness and
qualifications to perform work", then an arbitration regarding the merits of the
termination is further required. Id. On September 19, 2002, UTA appealed to the
Utah Court of Appeals the Order in its entirety. On September 24, 2002, UTA
filed an amended notice of appeal, to correctly appeal the Order to the Utah
Supreme Court. On September 30, 2002, UTA also filed with the Third Judicial
District Court a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, which was granted in January,
2003.
On or about October 18, 2002, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction. The Utah Court of Appeals denied the motion in
an order dated March 14, 2003. On July 29, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal for failure of the Appellant to file a brief, but on August 1, 2003 voided
that order of dismissal because the Court had not notified the parties of the
briefing schedule.
On September 9, 2003, the parties filed a Stipulation and Motion to
Transfer Case to the Utah Supreme Court, and the case was subsequently
transferred to the Supreme Court. The Plaintiffs have since requested that their

earlier Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction be submitted for review by this
Court.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about April 28, 1999, Plaintiff and Appellant Amalgamated Transit Union,

Local 382 ("Union") entered into the Labor Contract, which was in effect at the time of
Jolley's termination. The Labor Contract addresses when arbitration may be pursued,
and how it will be conducted. With regard to probationary employees, paragraph A of
Article 7 of the Labor Contract provides that:
"All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked one
hundred ten (110) days. During such period, the Authority is the sole judge
of ability, competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work. This
judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration procedure.
Otherwise, the Union shall have the right to represent the employee."
(Addendum B at 3.)
Following Jolley's termination, the Union requested from UTA a review of
Jolley's termination in letters dated August 24, 2000, and September 1, 2000.
(Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("PI. Mem. in
Support"), Exh. B; Compl., Exh. B.) The Union brought its request for a discipline
review under Article 12 of the Labor Contract. (PI. Mem. in Support at f 8, Exh. F at ^
4.) UTA did not agree to the Union's request for a discipline review of Jolley's
termination, and the Union later filed their Complaint to Compel Arbitration.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court's Order undercuts significant procedural requirements of the
Labor Contract. The Trial Court in part ordered the parties to arbitrate whether Jolley
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was terminated based on her "abilities, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform
work". (Order at 2.) However, that question is different from the question raised by the
Union under Article 12 of the Labor Contract. Pursuant to Article 12, the Union sought a
review of the merits of the Jolley termination. Accordingly, the Labor Contract limits the
issue that may be arbitrated in this matter, if any, to the merits of the Jolley termination.
At the same time, the Labor Contract prevents the Plaintiffs from now pursuing, and an
arbitrator from now deciding, a contract interpretation or application dispute not
preserved for arbitration under Article 13 of the Labor Contract. Because the Plaintiffs
never filed a grievance relating to the Jolley matter under Article 13 of the Contract, the
Plaintiffs lost any opportunity to take to an arbitrator a contract interpretation or
application question relating to the Jolley termination.
The Trial Court's first question for an arbitrator amounts to an arbitrability
question, and a question that involves applying the contract language to the facts of the
Jolley termination. Both such questions cannot be raised through the procedures of
Article 12, but instead must be raised under the procedures of Article 13. Because the
Plaintiffs passed on an Article 13 grievance, an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction under the
Labor Contract to hear the Trial Court's first ordered arbitration question. Consequently,
the Trial Court's Order is clearly at odds with the Labor Contract.
While the Trial Court erroneously shifted to an arbitrator a question disallowed
under the Labor Contract, it contemporaneously failed to fully answer the only
arbitrability question pursued by the Plaintiffs under the Contract — whether the Jolley
termination itself is arbitrable. The Trial Court's failure to decide that question also

contradicts the Utah Arbitration Act. Under the plain language of that Act, the Trial
Court should have "determined [the] issues" of arbitrability. By delegating to an
arbitrator the ultimate determination of whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable, the
Trial Court did not completely determine the arbitrability issues in accordance with the
Act.
If the Trial Court had properly reached the ultimate arbitrability question in this
case, summary judgment for the Plaintiffs would have been prevented by genuine issues
of material fact. Here, the Trial Court was required to decide whether the Jolley
termination is arbitrable. Thus, to grant summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, the
Trial Court had to first decide that, in accordance with the Plaintiffs' interpretation of
Article 7, Jolley was terminated for reasons unrelated to work performance. Otherwise,
Jolley's termination would not be arbitrable under the Plaintiffs reading of Article 7.
However, UTA raised genuine issues of material fact as to each of the factual allegations
asserted by the Plaintiffs in support of their theory that Jolley was terminated for reasons
unrelated to work performance. Summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs'
interpretation of Article 7 was improper in view of those disputed factual allegations.
Lastly, the Trial Court should have granted UTA's Motion for Summary Judgment
because the second and third sentences of paragraph A of Article 7 unambiguously
exclude any termination of a probationary employee from the arbitration process. In
those sentences, the contracting parties meticulously reserved to UTA wide discretion
regarding a probationary employee's work performance. Yet, that clear reservation of
discretion will be wholly abrogated under the Plaintiffs' interpretation of Article 7
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because UTA's discretion under those sentences will be scrutinized every time a decision
is made on whether the probationary employee was terminated for reasons relating to
work performance. That result compels the conclusion that Article 7 prohibits
arbitrations of probationary employee terminations as a matter of law.
When the Trial Court found that Article 7 does not unambiguously exclude
probationary employee terminations from the arbitration process by denying UTA's
Motion, it should have alternatively found that Article 7 is ambiguous because UTA
raised a reasonable, alternate interpretation of that Article. Based on such an ambiguity,
summary judgment for the Plaintiffs was improper. Correspondingly, absent a decision
that Article 7 was unambiguous in UTA's favor, the Trial Court should have denied both
summary judgment motions and allowed the parties to present to the Court extrinsic
evidence to explain the parties intent under that Article.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DELEGATION OF AN ARBITRABILITY
QUESTION TO THE ARBITRATOR VIOLATES THE LABOR
CONTRACT.
The Trial Court overlooked the Labor Contracts clear arbitration requirements

when it ordered an arbitrator to decide whether Jolly was terminated based on work
performance. (Order at 2.) The Trial Court committed reversible error by sending that
question to an arbitrator for two principal reasons. First, the Trial Court failed to fully
decide the only arbitrability question raised by the Union under the Labor Contract —
whether the Jolly termination is arbitrable. Second, an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction under
the Labor Contract to decide that question because the question was not grieved by the

Plaintiffs as required under the Contract. Since an arbitrator is barred by the Labor
Contract from reviewing first arbitration question ordered by the Trial Court, the Order
should be vacated.
A.

The Labor Contract Requires the Union to Challenge UTA's
Interpretation of the Contract, or Application of the Contract to Facts,
under Article 13 of the Contract.

The Union and UTA expressly agreed to two distinct processes for bringing
a dispute to arbitration. Under the Labor Contract, a "suspension or discharge" is
challenged under Article 12. (See Addendum B at 7-8.) If the Union elects to challenge
a contemplated or administered discipline, it may only do so by requesting a discipline
review in writing within the prescribed time. Id. Article 12 also details the subsequent
review steps that the Union may invoke to challenge a discipline matter, including a
preliminary hearing, a Grievance Review Committee, and an Article 14 arbitration.
(Addendum B at 8-9.)
By comparison, if the Union elects to challenge UTA's interpretation or
application of the Labor Contract, it may only do so by filing a written grievance under
Article 13. (Addendum B at 9 ("FIRST STEP . . . [t]he grievance form must be
submitted in writing").) Article 13 enumerates the procedures that the Union must follow
to pursue further review of the grieved issue, including an investigation and answer by
the Human Resources Department, a Grievance Review Committee, and an Article 14
arbitration. (Addendum B at 9-10.)
UTA and the Union agreed that the Union must follow the procedures in Article
12 to move a discipline to arbitration, and that the Union must follow the procedures in
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Article 13 to move a contract interpretation or application dispute to arbitration. That
agreement is cemented in the plain language of the Labor Contract. For instance, Article
14 provides that "[ojnly grievances which have been timely processed by the Union
through the grievance steps in Article 12 or 13 and which allege a violation of this
Agreement including a claim alleging unjust suspension or termination) may be carried to
arbitration". (Addendum B at 11.) In addition, under both Articles, the Union's request
for arbitration is plainly contingent on the Union following the previously stated steps in
the respective Articles. For example, under Article 12 the Union may only request
arbitration "within twenty-eight (28) days after receipt of the decision of the hearing
officer". (Addendum B at 8.) Similarly, under Article 13, the Union may only request
arbitration "within twenty-eight (28) calendar days after the Step Two answer".
(Addendum Bat 10.)
In short, the parties to the Labor Contract established two independent processes
for taking discipline disputes and contract language disputes to arbitration. The Labor
Contract requires the Union to follow the Article 13 procedures to move a contract
interpretation or application issue to arbitration.
B.

The Plaintiffs Never Filed a Grievance Under Article 13 of the
Labor Contract.
1.

The Plaintiffs Only Sought a Discipline Review Under Article 12
of the Labor Contract

The Union elected to challenge Jolley's termination under Article 12 of the Labor
Contract. For example, in an August 24, 2000, letter from the Union President, Steve
Booth, to UTA, the Union President requested a "review of discipline". (PI. Mem. in
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Support, Exh. B.) Again, in a September 1, 2000, letter from the Union President to
UTA, the Union requested a "review of the discipline issued to Operator Caroline JolleyChristensen on or about July 18, 2000". (Compl., Exh. B.) Finally, the Plaintiffs
admitted in their Points of Fact in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support, and in the
Union President's attached sworn affidavit, that "pursuant to Article 12 of the CBA,
Local 382 on behalf of Plaintiff Caroline Jolley filed a Request for Review of the
disputed termination issued by UTA to Caroline". (PI. Mem. in Support at ^f 8, Exh. F at
Tf 4.) Under the foregoing undisputed facts, there can be no doubt that the Union and
Jolley elected to challenge the discharge, and pursued that challenge, under the discipline
review procedures of Article 12 of the Labor Contract.
2.

The Record Lacks any Evidence that the Plaintiffs filed an
Article 13 Grievance.

There is no evidence in the record that the Plaintiffs at any time filed a grievance
under Article 13 in connection with Jolley or Article 7. While the Plaintiffs assert in the
Complaint that Jolley filed a grievance under Article 13, the Plaintiffs at no time
supported that assertion with any competent evidence. On the contrary, the Plaintiffs
subsequently conceded through the sworn statement of the Union President that they
challenged Jolley's discharge under Article 12. Moreover, the Union can no longer
timely file an Article 13 grievance in connection with this matter because the deadline for
filing an Article 13 grievance has long since expired. {See, e.g., Addendum B (allowing
the Union eleven days "after the incident giving rise to the incident is known to exist").)
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C

The Trial Court's First Question for the Arbitrator is Erroneous as a
Matter of Law Because An Arbitrator is Contractually Limited to
Reviewing the Merits of the Jolley Termination.
1.

The Trial Court Was Asked to Determine the Arbitrability of a
Termination Challenged under Article 12 of the Labor Contract.

Because the Plaintiffs requested a discipline review under Article 12 of the Labor
Contract, and never filed a grievance under Article 13, the only permissible pathway to
arbitration in connection with the Jolley discharge is through Article 12. As explained
more fully in Section LA of this Brief, the Labor Contract requires the Union to pursue an
arbitration of a discipline in accordance with the Article 12 procedural pathway, and to
pursue a contract interpretation or application dispute under the Article 13 procedural
pathway. Here, the Plaintiffs only challenged UTA's decisions concerning Jolley under
Article 12 of the Labor Contract. Accordingly, when the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint
to Compel Arbitration, the only arbitration that they could seek to compel under the terms
of the Labor Contract was an arbitration of Jolley's termination.1 Hence, the only
question before the Trial Court was whether the merits of the Jolley termination were
arbitrable.

1

While the Plaintiffs suggested to the Trial Court that Article 13 permits the arbitration
of contract interpretation disputes, and that the dispute in this case concerning the
meaning of Article 7 of the Labor Contract should be heard by an arbitrator, the Plaintiffs
are precluded by contract from seeking an Article 13 arbitration on a contract
interpretation or application issue because they failed to file an Article 13 grievance as
required under the Labor Contract. (E.g., Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4.)
13

2.

The Trial Court Failed to Fully Decide the Article 12
Arbitrability Question.

The Trial Court failed to decide whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable. If the
Trial Court had done so, the only question for arbitration in the Trial Court's Order would
be whether UTA had just cause to terminate Jolley. Instead, the Trial Court ordered that
an arbitrator to first decide:
Whether or not the termination of employment of Caroline Jolley-Christensen by
Utah Transit Authority (UTA) was based upon her abilities, competency, fitness,
and qualifications to perform work.
(hereinafter, the "First Question for Arbitration" or "First Question"). (Order at ^f 2.)
The Trial Court further ordered that, if the answer to the First Question for Arbitration is
in the affirmative, then the jurisdiction of the arbitrator ends. (Order at ^f 3.) However, if
the answer to the First Question is in the negative, "the arbitrator shall further find the
reasons Caroline Jolley-Christensen was terminated and what, if any, remedies for said
termination are appropriated [sic] under the parties5 Collective Bargaining Agreement".
Id.
By creating a threshold jurisdictional question for the arbitrator, the Trial Court
has shifted, at least in part, the arbitrability question to an arbitrator. Under the Trial
Court's two-step arbitration, before the arbitrator reaches the merits of the termination,
the arbitrator must first decide whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction to even reach the
merits of the termination and, in effect, whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable.
Therefore, although the Trial Court interpreted the language of the Labor Contract to the
extent that it decided that the Jolley discharge might be arbitrable (depending on the
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arbitrator's answer to the First Question), it did not decide the arbitrability question of
whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable. Rather, the Trial Court ordered an arbitrator
to complete the arbitrability analysis on the Jolley termination. In brief, the Trial Court
failed to decide the only arbitrability question properly presented by the Plaintiffs under
the Labor Contract.
3.

An Arbitrator May Only Review the Merits of the Discipline
Challenged by the Plaintiffs under Article 12.

The First Question for Arbitration exceeds the Article 12 arbitration issue allowed
under the Labor Contract. As discussed for fully infra, the Plaintiffs decided their
arbitration fate when they elected to challenge the Jolley matter solely under Article 12 of
the Labor Contract. Because Article 12 sets out the procedures for taking only the review
of disciplines to arbitration, the arbitrator is limited to reviewing the merits of the
discipline when an Article 12 challenge advances to arbitration. Accordingly, because
the Plaintiffs only proceeded under Article 12, an arbitrator is likewise limited to
reviewing only the merits of the Jolley termination. Since the First Question probes more
than the merits of the termination by probing the arbitrator's jurisdiction to hear the
merits, that Question is incongruent with the procedural mandate of the Labor Contract.
D.

The Labor Contract Prohibits the Plaintiffs from Arbitrating an
Article 13 Issue Relating to the Jolley Termination.

Because the Plaintiffs never filed an Article 13 grievance, the First Question is
prohibited under the Labor Contract. Under the Labor Contract, an arbitrator may only
arbitrate questions of contract interpretation or application if those questions are raised
through the grievance procedures set forth in Article 13. In the present case, the First
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Question for Arbitration is in effect an arbitrability question. Arbitrability questions
hinge on the interpretation of language in an agreement to arbitrate, or to exclude
arbitration, or the application of that language to a set of facts. For instance, under the
First Question for Arbitration, the Trial Court ordered an arbitrator to decide whether
Jolley was terminated based on her "abilities, competency, fitness, and qualifications to
perform work", which in essence requires the arbitrator to apply Article 7 of the Labor
Contract to the facts of the Jolley termination to determine whether the Jolley termination
may be arbitrated. Therefore, the First Question is an arbitrability question.
However, the Union did not grieve an arbitrability question in the present case.
Under the Labor Contract, disputes concerning contract interpretation or application must
be raised by the Union under Article 13 of the Labor Contract. Therefore, an arbitrator
may only decide arbitrability, or apply the Contract to the Jolley facts, if the arbitrability
question or contract application question is properly challenged via the Article 13
pathway. The Plaintiffs could have filed a grievance under Article 13 when UTA did not
agree to Plaintiffs' request for a discipline review of Jolley's termination based on its
interpretation of Article 7. At that point, they could have claimed that UTA
misinterpreted Article 7, or misapplied Article 7 to the Jolley facts. However, the
Plaintiffs never filed such a grievance.
Because the Plaintiffs did not pursue an Article 13 challenge of UTA's
interpretation or application of Article 7, they cannot now seek to have that question
heard by an arbitrator. Simply put, an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction under the Labor

Contract to review an Article 13 question not properly grieved by the Plaintiffs in
accordance with the Article 13 procedures.
The Trial Court committed reversible error by sending to an arbitrator a question
that is jurisdictionally barred under the Labor Contract. In reviewing a trial court's
granting or denial of summary judgment, the appellate court reviews each issue under
that judgment "for correctness, according no deference to its legal conclusions". West
Jordan City, 999 P.2d at 1242. Here, the Plaintiffs are contractually barred from seeking
a review of an arbitrability question from an arbitrator because they did not pursue a
grievance under Article 13. By shifting an arbitrability question, and an Article 13
question at that, to an arbitrator, the Trial Court interpreted or applied the Labor Contract
in a manner that runs afoul of the Contract. Consequently, the summary judgment in
favor of the Plaintiffs should be reversed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT FELL SHORT OF ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE
UTAH ARBITRATION ACT TO DECIDE THE ENTIRE
ARBITRABILITY QUESTION.
The Utah Arbitration Act ("Act") prohibits the Trial Court from deferring to an

arbitrator the arbitrability question presented to that Court. The Act provides, in pertinent
part, that:
If an issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the
scope of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those
issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly.
Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-4(l) (Repealed effective May 15, 2003.) Under that Section
78-31a-4(l), the Trial Court was obligated to determine the arbitrability question properly
raised under the Labor Contract. Significantly, the Act did not provide that the Trial
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Court could only decide a portion of that question. Instead, the Trial Court was expected
to "determine those issues".
The Trial Court failed to "determine those issues" relating to the arbitrability of
the Jolley termination. As previously discussed in Section I.B.I of this Brief, because the
Plaintiffs only sought review of the termination under Article 12 of the Labor Contract,
the only issue that may conceivably have been arbitrated was whether the termination
was proper. Therefore, when the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint to Compel Arbitration,
the Trial Court was required under the Act to decide whether the Labor Contract required
an arbitration of the termination. However, in effect, the Trial Court only decided that
the termination may be arbitrable based on the Article 7 language, and left the completion
of the arbitrability analysis to an arbitrator by way of the First Question. The Trial
Court's divided approach to the arbitrability question is out of step with the Acts' plain
intention under Section 78-31a-4(l) to reserve the entire determination of the arbitrability
issues to the Court.
III.

A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDES SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS' INTERPRETATION OF
ARTICLE 7.
Based on both the Labor Contract and the Utah Arbitration Act, the Trial

Court erred by failing to decide whether the Jolley termination is arbitrable. Had the
Trial Court addressed that arbitrability question, it would have faced genuine issues of
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material fact that bar summary judgment for the Plaintiffs on that question.
Before entering summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs' interpretation of
Article 7 of the Labor Contract, the Court was required to decide whether the Jolley
termination was arbitrable as a matter of law and, therefore, whether the Plaintiffs had
shown that Jolley was discharged for a reason unrelated to her work performance. In
general, the Plaintiffs asserted that the second, third, and fourth sentences of paragraph A
of Article 7 of the Labor Contract mean that, in the case of a probationary employee who
is terminated for reasons other than ability, competency, fitness, or qualifications to
perform work, the termination is arbitrable. (E.g., Transcript of Hearing Held August 20,
2002 Before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson (hereinafter, "Tr. at

") at 5; Plaintiffs

Memorandum in Opposition ("PI. Mem. in Opposition") at 3.) Thus, under the Plaintiffs'
interpretation of paragraph A, arbitration of a probationary employee's termination is
only appropriate if the termination is not based on the employee's ability, competency,
fitness, or qualifications to perform work. Further, under that approach, arbitrability of
the termination hinges on a threshold determination that the termination was not based on
the employee's work performance. While the Trial Court interpreted paragraph A in
favor of the Plaintiffs' contention that paragraph A allows for the arbitration of a
termination of a probationary employee if the termination is not based on work

The fact that UTA and the Plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment arguing
that Article 7 of the Labor Contract is unambiguous did not prohibit UTA from asserting
that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment under
Plaintiffs' interpretation of Article 7. See, e.g., Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 824-25.
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performance, the Court did not decide whether Jolley's termination was based on work
performance as a matter of law before summarily sending the termination to arbitration.
Even if the Trial Court had reached the question of whether Jolley was terminated
for reasons relating to work performance, genuine issues of material fact prevented a
summary judgment on that question. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law". Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Here,
summary judgment was wholly inappropriate because any facts regarding whether the
Jolley termination was based on work performance were in dispute. Indeed, the Plaintiffs
admitted that there is a factual dispute regarding the reason for Jolley's termination. (PL
Mem. in Support at 4.) Moreover, at no time did the Plaintiffs offer a single sworn fact
of a termination reason unrelated to Jolley's work performance. Therefore, a Trial Court
could not possibly determine as a matter of law that Jolley's termination was unrelated to
work performance.3
Additionally, UTA demonstrated a genuine dispute regarding each of the three
alleged facts which the Plaintiffs asserted to support their purported "good faith belief
that Jolley was terminated for reasons other than work performance. (See PL Mem. in

3

Even the Trial Court appeared to recognize at hearing the lack of evidence in the record
to support the Plaintiffs' pretext theory. (See, e.g., Tr. at 37,11. 16-19 (Judge Hanson
asking Plaintiffs' counsel "What do you got to show this is not based upon the ability, the
competency, the fitness, or qualifications to perform work. Am I just doing something
for the sake of exercise?"), 38,11. 6-8 ("So if you choose not to present anything and you
have not in your papers then I guess I'm going to have to take the position . . . you have
nothing), 39,11. 7-8 ("But you're asking me to take on faith that there is something here
that is not work related").
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Support at T| 12.) It is well settled that "[b]ecause disposition of a case on summary
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions of
fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be
resolved in favor of the opposing party". Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780
P.2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). UTA created doubt around, and defeated, each of
the Plaintiffs' three alleged facts underlying their "good faith belief. First, UTA showed
a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Plaintiffs' assertion that Jolley's
"supervisor recommended that [Jolley] be granted permanent status" in a memorandum.
(Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support at ^f 12(B).) In the proceedings below, UTA
demonstrated through sworn affidavits that (i) the supervisor's memorandum was
prepared before the end of Jolley's probationary period and before Jolley's subsequent
performance deficiencies, (ii) the Manager of the operations division takes an organized
approach to preparing for an operator's completion of probation, and asks supervisors to
prepare such memoranda in advance of the end of probation to ensure that a bonus check
is ready on the operator's completion of probation, (iii) the preparation of the
memorandum did not alter Jolley's responsibility to continue to meet probationary
employee performance expectations, (iv) Jolley incurred another missout and sick
occurence, and a sick abuse policy violation, after the memorandum was written and
before the end of her probationary period, and (v) the Manager, and not the supervisor
who authored the memorandum, decides whether an employee passes probation. (UTA
Mem. in Opposition at 9-10.) Based on those sworn facts, UTA raised doubt regarding
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the Plaintiffs' "good faith belief to the extent such a belief was grounded in the
supervisor's memorandum.
Second, UTA raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning the Plaintiffs1
allegation that "[u]nder UTA's own point system used to evaluate probationary
employees, [Jolley] was within the standards for pertinent [sic] employment". (PL Mem.
in Support at f 12(C), Exh. F at Tf 8(C).) In particular, UTA showed through supporting
sworn statements that (i) the referenced point system is only one tool, and not the sole,
determinative tool, for deciding whether a probationary employee passes probation, and
(ii) Jolley's points under the referenced point system exceeded the 18-point guideline.
Third, UTA created sufficient doubt concerning the Plaintiffs' claim that "[i]n the
past, many probationary employees have been retained by UTA even though they had
'attendance problems' more severe than [Jolley]". (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at Tf 12(A),
Exh. F at If 8(A).) Based on uncontested affidavits, UTA convincingly showed that the
Plaintiffs' claim was inaccurate. In fact, UTA's survey of other probationary employee
records revealed that Jolley used more sick days than any other probationary operator in a
near two-year period that included Jolley's period of employment. Also, UTA called into
doubt each of the three Guidelines forms submitted by the Plaintiffs in support of their
claim by showing that one of the forms did not relate to attendance, and the remaining
forms did not reflect the number of work days missed to draw a meaningful comparison
of attendance records.
In brief, the Plaintiffs failed to offer any competent evidence of a reason for
Jolley's termination that is not related to her work performance. Further, through sworn
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statements UTA provided more than adequate competing facts to create a genuine issue
of material fact regarding each of the three factual allegations that the Plaintiffs suggest
support their "good faith basis" that Jolley was terminated for reasons other than work
performance. As a result, the Trial Court could not determine as a matter of law that
Jolley was terminated for reasons other than work performance. Because such a
determination is integral to a summary judgment based on the Plaintiffs1 interpretation of
the Labor Contract, summary judgment for the Plaintiffs was improper.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING UTA'S MOTION IN THE
FACE OF UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT LANGUAGE THAT EXCLUDES
THE ORDERED ARBITRATION.
The Trial Court misapplied contract interpretation principles when it denied
UTA's Motion for Summary Judgment. By ordering the First Question for Arbitration,
the Court decided that the Labor Contract allows for the arbitration of a probationary
employee's termination if the employee's termination is not related to work performance.
(Order at 2.) To reach that decision, the Trial Court interpreted paragraph A of Article 7
of the Labor Contract, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked one hundred ten
(110) days. During such period the Authority is the sole judge of ability,
competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work. This judgment shall not
be subject to the grievance or arbitration procedure. Otherwise, the Union shall
have the right to represent the employee.
(hereinafter, "paragraph A") (Addendum B at 3 (emphasis added).) Contrary to the Trial
Court's holding, the second and third sentences of that language unambiguously bar
arbitration of Jolley's termination as a matter of law.

A.

The Second and Third Sentences of Paragraph A of Article 7 Clearly
Preclude Arbitration of a Probationary Employee's Termination.

The parties to the Labor Contract plainly intended to forego arbitrations relating to
a probationary employee's termination. "In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the
parties are controlling". Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc's, 2002 UT
3, U 12, 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). Further, a court "'first look[s] to the four corners of the
agreement to determine the intentions of the parties'". Id. quoting Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Additionally, "[i]f the language
within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties intentions are
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be
inteipreted as a matter of law". Id. Contractual language is "ambiguous if it is capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing
terms, or other facial deficiencies'". Winegar at 108 quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665
P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). In reviewing the Trial Court's interpretation of the Labor
Contract at the summary judgment stage, this Court may review whether the Trial Court
correctly decided whether paragraph A is ambiguous. See e.g., Interwest Construction v.
Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996). Here, the Trial Court erred as a matter of
law when it failed to conclude that the second and third sentences of paragraph A can
only be interpreted as UTA proposed to give any meaning to those sentences.
The second sentence of paragraph A broadcasts in three key ways the contracting
parties' intention to yield wide discretion to UTA on whether to retain a probationary
employee. First, the parties went through great effort to explain the breadth of UTA's

discretion regarding probationary employees when they stated that "the Authority is the
sole judge of ability, competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work" during an
employee's probationary period. (Addendum at 3 (emphasis added).) While the parties
could have stopped at "ability" to perform work, or "qualifications to perform work",
they decided not to do so. Instead, the contracting parties made an obvious effort to
enumerate all scenarios relating to a probationary employee's work for UTA, and
reserved judgment in all of those areas. Accordingly, the only reasonable interpretation
of that phrase is that UTA has full discretion to judge all aspects of a probationary
employee's performance. Second, the parties elected to designate UTA as the "judge" of
a probationary employee's ability, competency, fitness, and qualifications. By using the
term "judge", the parties plainly intended that UTA has the authority to make decisions
regarding a probationary employee's performance based on the ordinary usage of that
term. Third, by inserting the term "sole" before "judge", the parties elected to give added
emphasis to the unobstructed decisions that UTA may make in connection with a
probationary employee's performance.
While the second sentence of paragraph A, in and of itself, delegates all
decisionmaking on a probationary employee's performance to UTA, the third sentence
leaves no room for misunderstanding of that delegation. In particular, the third sentence
clearly provides that "[t]his judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration
procedure". (Addendum B at 3.) By stating "[t]his judgment", the parties patently linked
UTA's judgments on a probationary employee's performance to the judgments excluded
from the arbitration procedure. Further, because "judgments" clearly include decisions,
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and the "arbitration procedure" of Article 14 covers arbitrations of disciplines, the
Contract when read as a whole unambiguously excludes from the Article 14 arbitration
provisions UTA's decisions relating to a probationary employee's performance.
B.

The Second and Third Sentences Are Nullified Under the Trial Court's
and Plaintiffs' Interpretation of those Sentences.

The Labor Contract's clear exclusion of the Jolley termination from the Article 14
arbitration process is grounded in the contract interpretation tenet that bars the
"addition], ignoring], or discarding] of words" when interpreting contracts. Cornwall
v. Willow Creek Country Club, 369 P.2d 928, 929 (Utah 1962). By denying UTA's
motion for summary judgment, and granting the Plaintiffs' motion, the Trial Court
effectively discarded the second and third sentences of paragraph A.
The Plaintiffs and the Trial Court apparently agreed that the second and third
sentences prohibit arbitration of UTA decision to terminate a probationary employee
based on work performance. However, UTA has maintained that the second and third
sentences musl also be interpreted to prohibit arbitrations of any UTA decision to
terminate a probationary employee. To interpret those sentences in any other manner
renders them meaningless.
In particular, if the Union is allowed to file a discipline review under Article 12
any time it has an alleged "good faith belief that a probationary employee was not
terminated for a performance reason, UTA's sole judgment on the "ability competency,
fitness and qualification [of a probationary employee] to perform work" will be
scrutinized in an arbitral forum despite the clear intention of the parties to isolate those
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judgments from that process. For example, as a practical matter an arbitrator cannot
review whether the termination of a probationary employee was related to work
performance without probing the reasons for the termination and, at the same time,
UTA's "judgment" regarding the employee's work performance. Indeed, if the Trial
Court's Order is affirmed, the arbitrator will hear testimony regarding, and dissect,
UTA's thoughts and decisions on, Jolley's work performance to determine whether she
was terminated for performance-related reasons. Moreover, the Labor Contract's
reservation of sole discretion to UTA on decisions regarding a probationary employee's
performance cannot reasonably be unraveled by a mere hunch or "good faith belief of
the Union that the employee was not terminated for performance reasons.
Because the second and third sentences are nullified if UTA's interpretation of
those sentences is not granted, the Trial Court erred in finding any merit in the Plaintiffs'
interpretation.4 At the end of the day, the Plaintiffs' and Trial Court's interpretation of
paragraph A is wholly unreasonable because is depletes the second and third sentences of
any meaning. Because there is no alternate reasonable interpretation to compete with
UTA's reading of those sentences, those sentences unambiguously preclude arbitrations
of probationary employee terminations as a matter of law.

For the same reasons, the Trial Court's focus on the phrase "to perform work" in the
second sentence is unreasonable. Surely, the contracting parties did not carefully script
the second sentence to grant extensive discretion to UTA regarding probationary
employees, only to see that discretion so easily quashed by conjecture that UTA's
judgment was not based on work perfomiance. Instead, it is far more reasonable to
conclude that the parties intended to exclude all probationary employee terminations
from review, rather than carve out an exception that swallows the rule.
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Similarly, the fourth sentence of paragraph A cannot be reasonably construed to
allow arbitrations of probationary employee terminations that are not based on
performance and thereby, undermine the second and third sentences of that paragraph.
The Plaintiffs suggested that the fourth sentence means that the Union "shall have the
right to represent the employee" in connection with a termination not based on a
probationary employee's ability, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform work.
(PL Mem. in Opposition at 3.) However, like the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the second
and third sentences, their interpretation of the fourth sentence would allow an arbitrator to
question UTA's "sole judgment" of a probationary employee's ability, competency,
fitness, and qualifications to perform work" by simply touting a "good faith belief that a
termination of a probationary employee was not based on work performance.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the fourth sentence is unreasonable
in the context of the entire Labor Contract. Under the Labor Contract, the Union
represents probationary employees and regular employees alike on matters unrelated to
terminations or other disciplines, including but not limited to transfers, seniority, wages,
and working conditions. (E.g., UTA Mem. in Support, Exh. A at 3 (transfers), 4
(seniority), 22 (wages), 39 (addressing some operator working conditions).) Thus, the
fourth sentence simply clarifies the Union's option to continue to represent probationary
employees on matters that affect all probationary employees.
Because the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the fourth sentence unnaturally stretches
that sentence beyond its plain meaning, and requires a discarding of the second and third
sentences, that interpretation is unreasonable. Accordingly, the Trial Court erred to the
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extent that it relied upon that interpretation of the fourth sentence in denying UTA's
motion.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION BECAUSE UTA'S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 7 IS, AT A
MINIMUM, A REASONABLE ALTERNATE INTERPRETATION THAT
CREATES AN AMBIGUITY THAT BARS SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
THE PLAINTIFFS.
Even if the Trial Court did not interpret the language of paragraph A of Article 7

to unambiguously exclude an arbitration of any termination of a probationary employee,
the Trial Court was compelled to rule that UTA presented a reasonable contract
interpretation that such an exclusion exists, and that the relevant language was
ambiguous. "[A] motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion
is reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what
the parties intended". Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293.
In the present case, even if the meaning of paragraph A is not unambiguous in
favor of UTA's interpretation of that paragraph, then at the very least, an ambiguity
exists in that language that renders erroneous the Trial Court's granting of summary
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. UTA presented to the Trial Court, and now to this
Court, an interpretation of paragraph A that is more than reasonable. For example, UTA
has shown that the second, third, and fourth sentences of paragraph A may be reasonably
construed to exclude all terminations of probationary employees from the arbitration
process. The reasonability of that interpretation is anchored in the breadth of the
discretion granted to UTA in the second sentence of paragraph A, and the wholly
unintended outcome of any other interpretation. For instance, if those sentences do not
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exclude arbitrations of all probationary employee terminations, the plain intent of second
and third sentences of paragraph A to reserve judgments on probationary employees'
work performance to UTA, will be lost.5
In short, UTA presented to the Trial Court a compelling and reasonable
interpretation of paragraph A as an alternative to the Plaintiffs' interpretation of that
paragraph. As a result, the dispositive language on arbitrability is ambiguous if not
unambiguous in UTA's favor. Based on such an ambiguity, the Trial Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs' was reversible error.
Furthermore, because paragraph A is, at a minimum, ambiguous, if not
unambiguous in UTA's favor, the Trial Court erroneously deprived UTA of the
opportunity to present extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the contracting parties' intent
under paragraph A. If an ambiguity exists in the contract, the court interpreting the
contract must examine extrinsic evidence "in order to determine the intentions of the
parties". Central Florida at ^ 12. Here, UTA's reasonable interpretation of paragraph A
prompts at least an ambiguity that compels an opportunity for the parties to present to the
Trial Court parole evidence, practice evidence, or other extrinsic evidence to illuminate
the parties' intent under paragraph A. See e.g., Colonial Leasing Co. of New England,

The Trial Court appears to have already recognized that UTA presented a reasonable
alternate interpretation to the Plaintiffs interpretation of paragraph A. The Court inferred
that it viewed the contract as "pretty straightforward" in favor of UTA's interpretation at
the start of the hearing, but stated at the end of the hearing that he was "not so sure now".
(Tr. at 43,11. 24-25, 44,11. 1-3.) Presumably, the Trial Court found reasonability in
UTA's interpretation if it was leaning toward ruling in favor of that interpretation at the
start of the hearing. (Tr. at 5,11. 3-4 (Judge stating to Plaintiffs' counsel "Tell me why
Article 7 doesn't mean what it appears to say").
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Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986) (parole evidence
admissible to clarify parties intent under agreement); Zeese v. Estate of Seigel 534 P.2d
85, 90 (Utah 1975) (doctrine of practical construction). The Trial Court erred by denying
UTA that opportunity.
CONCLUSION
Because the Trial Court's First Question for Arbitration is contractually barred,
UTA respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court's granting of summary
judgment for the Plaintiffs and vacate the Order connected with that judgment. In
addition, UTA requests that this Court reverse the granting of Plaintiffs' motion because
the Trial Court did not decide the arbitrability question raised with that Court and, if it
had, genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment on that
arbitrability question.
Finally, UTA asks this Court to reverse the Trial Court's granting of Plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment, reverse that Court's denial of UTA's motion for summary
judgment, and find that UTA's interpretation of the Labor Contract is unambiguous as a
matter of law. However, even if this Court does not find that the Labor Contract
language unambiguously supports UTA's position, UTA requests that this Court reverse
the granting of Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and remand this matter to the Trial

Court to allow for the presentation of extrinsic evidence on the intent of the contracting
parties.
DATED this 10th day of October, 2003.
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ADDENDUM

A.

Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate of the Honorable Judge Timothy R.
Hanson, dated September 5, 2002.

B.

Articles 7, 12, 13, and 14 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Utah
Transit Authority and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382.

Id

Tab A

F

K r D d D ' S J^CT COURT
Third Judicial District

S f P - 5 2002
JOSEPH E. HATCH (#1415)
JOSEPH E. HATCH, P.C.
341 South Main Street, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 538-0400
Facsimile (801) 538-0423
Attorney ioi Plaintiffs

IN I'Hh; THIKh II IDK'IAI, DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,
LOCAL 382, an unincorporated labor
organization, and CAROLINE
JOLLEY-CHRISTENSEN, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER
TO ARBITRATE
Civil No. 000910111
|

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

j

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah |
incorporated special transit district, j
Defendant.
Plaintiffs' Moi KIII for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment both dated May 2, 2002, came regularly before the
Honorable I'mioU'v R Uans< n one oi thr judges ol the above entitled court, for
oral argument on August 20, 2002. The Plaintiffs were represented by Council,
Joseph h Hatch, I'lu1 Detuidant was represented hy Couneil, DesireeD. Peri.

The Court, having c- -...:< <

•

i leadings, papers a i id IT lemorandum on file

herein and having heard the oral argument, entered the basis for its ruling on
the record and is now prepared to enter the following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion For Surr.

«u:-,w

< *.T jr.-

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated tj ^

u- • • , -o

t

a-.-

and pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties dated
April 28, 1999, the parties shall submit to arbitration the following issue:
Whether or not the termination of employment of Caroline
Jolley-Christensen by the Utah Transit Authority (UTA)
was based upon her abilities, competency, fitness, and
qualifications to perform work.
3.

Should the arbitrator find that Caroline Jolley-Christensen's

employment was terminated because of her ability, c on lpetei icy , fitness, a nd
qualifications (or lack thereof) to perform work, the jurisdiction of the arbitrator
shall end and Caroline Jolley-Christensen's termina tioi i sha 11 be decreed
appropriate under the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement. However,
should the arbitrator find that Caroline Jolley-Christensen s employment was
terminated by the UTA for reasons other than her ability,
competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work, then the arbitrator
sha11 further find the reasons Caroline Jolley-Christensen was terminated and

what, if any, remedies for said termination are appropriated under the parties'
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
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Plaintiffs are awarded their costs.

DATED this

^

day of

Jb_fj~~

2<2fb2.

"he Honorable Timothy R^jhanson
'Third D i s t r i ^ C o u r t Judgg
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 382

ARIICLE 1: DURATION OF AGREEMENT
The Agreement is effective December 11, 1998, and continues in full force and effect
through December 10, 2003, andfromyear to year thereafter unless either party shall give notice
of a desire to ter i n inate oi n lodi fy the Agreement not less tha n sixty (60) days prior to such
expiration date or its anniversary.

ARTICLE 2; UNION RECOGNITION
The Authority recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent
f oi all i notoi coach and I ,R\ opei ators (except worker service operator s as defined in Article
42), parts and maintenance employees of the Authority.
Union representatives designated in writing shall be permitted to transact Union business.
on the premises of the

A

i ithoi ity dui ing voi ki rig 1 ioi n s > ; ith i na nagemei it persom lei or with

bargaining unit employees who can be and are relieved from duty. No representative shall
interfere with or delay any employee at work. Union representatives shall not neglect any work
for the Authority unless officially relieved of duty. Twenty-four (24) hours advance notice shall
be given when possible, in any case at least one (1) hour notice shall be given or by 5:00 a.m if
I he Hn}iIoyfT i' iPt'iimni In icpnil hefoie (» Oil a in.
Concerning any committee created by the Authority dealing with the terms and conditions
of employment and which is comprised in part of bargaining unit personnel, the I Jnion shall
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engage in any lockouts during the term of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 6: ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGREEMENT
Any business necessary to administer this Agreement shall be between designated
representatives of the Authority and of the Union or the International Union.
Before either party makes public any matter relating to issues covered by this Agreement,
the local Union President and the Director of Human Resources shall meet together in person to
discuss such matter. If no mutual resolution is reached, the parues shall defer contact with the
public for 24 hours.

ARTICLE 7: PROBATIONARY PERIOD
A.

All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked one hundred ten

(110) days. During such period the .Authority is the sole judge of ability, competency, fitness and
qualifications to perform work. This judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration
procedure.

Otherwise the Union snail have the right to- represent the employee.

Upon

completion of the probationary period, the employee shall have seniority back to the date of
employment, and if two or more employees begin work on the same day, their place on the
seniority list shall be determined by lot.
B.

Employees who complete the 110 working shifts probation period in one

department and later transfer to another department shall be considered to have completed the
probationary period set forth in this Article for the purposes of termination of employment, but
shall be considered probationary employees for the first 60 days worked in the new department
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considered permanent and seniority in the former depa rtment shall be reta ined up to the date of
transfer but shall nc: thereafter accumulate. Seniority in the new depanment shall commence as
of the initial date cf transfer.
Any employee accepting full time Union office or a permanent assignment outside the
bargaining unit with the Authority, shall retain and accumulate seniority during the period of such
ser vice

I Ipoi i i et: :i n ing to the bargaining unit the employee shall return,, to his/her original

classification and may exercise seniority to take the least senior available assignment or regular
run but otherwise shall bid for assignment on the next regular change or bid day.
Seniority " c ::: iti i mes to accumulate di iriiig any layoff or appi cved leave of abse: ice such
as for sickness or injury. Time zr. ieave is not considered time worked for any purpose except
accumulation of seniority.
Seniority "- ?J\ be lost whenever i •< npnvcv . . ,; is discharged for just i.aust* it.1 tires;
or fails to return to work within five ^5) work days alter the end of a leave of absence or the
receipt of notice cf recall from a layoff.

ARTICLE 9: LAYOFFS AND RECALLS
>i nu* t \i uj\ auvanu' uniuc ui neeessai\ Myoiis snail be given

Regular force

reductions shall be in the reverse order of departmental seniority. As classifications are reduced,
a senior employee facing lay-o££ may within five (5) days, displace a junior employee in a lower
classification. Any displaced employee shall li.ivc the sanu pmilej'e unless (ncnentnl from doing
so by sickness or leave of absence.
When ifLMiMi luicei of motor coach operators, parts or maintenance employees are
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is not discharged for other reasons, shall be granted a leave of absence.

ARTICLE 11 NOTICE OF DISCIPLINE
Employees shall be advised of any discipline or charges within eleven (11) calendar days
after the General Manager of the Authority or its designees have knowledge of any alleged
violation of Authority rules or other offenses. Oral warnings may be given, or the employee shall
be furnished a written statement of the offense or discipline. The written statement shall include
a description of the actions or behavior in which the employee is alleged to have engaged. Such
statement shail be sufficiently precise and complete so that the employee may be able to identify
the actions or behavior to which reference is made. For the purposes of this Article, persons who
have been retained to monitor service and performance shall be deemed designees of the General
Manager. Also, with respect to discipline for chargeable accidents, the time period under this
Article shall commence to run when the Accident Review Committee's report is received and
time-stamped in the Risk Management Department of the Authority. A copy of the time-stamped
report shall be furnished to the Union.

ARTICLE 12: SUSPENSION OR DISCHARGE
A prompt review shall be made in any situation where discharge or other discipline is
contemplated or has been administered, provided request for such review is made in writing to
the Human Resources Department within eleven (11) calendar days following notice by the
Authority to the Union that discharge or discipline may be involved. If no request is made to the
Authority within that time, and the discharge or discipline is administered by the Authority, such
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with i -I \y ifhuiii hack pay as deemed jusuiied b>' the" facts and evidence.
If either parry fails to meet the above time limits, the other party may automatically move
the matter to the next step in the procedure or arbitration. If a matter is not appealed by the
Union to the next step in a timely manner, it shall be deemed i esolved 01 1 tl le basis of the last
answer; provided, however, that if the Authority fails to meet any of the time deadlines and the
Union carries the matter to the next step, the Authority shall pay to the Union a penalty of $400.

ARTICLE 13: PROCEDURE FOR GRIEVANCES
The term "grievance", shail mean a complaint and/or dispute by the Union and/or
employee concerning the proper interpretation or application of any provision of this Agreement.
FIRST STEP: All grievances should first be discussed with the immediate
supei v isoi wl ic) si 101 ilci be adv ised oi the paiticularsectioi I of the agreement that is involved [lie
Union and the Authority agree that it is in the best interest of all parties to settle the dispute at
this stage. If not resolved in that discussion, or if other circumstances warrant, the Union or the
employee may fill out a grievance form pi o v ided b> t i: ic A,i ithority. I he grievance form must be
submitted in writing to the Human Resources D.epanment within eleven (11) calendar days after
the incident giving rise to the grievance is known to exist. Grievances in the Mount Ogden and
Timpanogos Divisions may be filed with the Operations Division Manager 's office
STEP TWO: Within seven (7) calendar days following thefilingof a grievance,
ihr Human Resources Deparlmein > ill investigate the tacts and evidence giving rise to the
grievance and shall give to the Union a written answer to the grievance.
STEP THREE: If the grievance is not satisfactorily resolved by the Step Two9

.Ail reasonable efforts should be made to avoid the expense and trouble of arbitration.
Within thirty-five (35) calendar days of request for arbitration, the parties shall either agree upon
an arbitrator or shall give notice of selection to the arbitrator who is next in order on the
expedited list of arbitrators existing as of the date of this Agreement. During the term of this
Agreement, either party may exercise one peremptory challenge to any arbitrator on the expedited
panel. If an arbitrator is removed by such challenge or by mutual agreement, a replacement shall
be selected by requesting a panel of names from the Federal Mediation Service. Seven (7)
calendar days after receipt of such panel the parties shall selea the replacement arbitrator by
alternately striking names from the panel with the first strike determined by lot. Extensions of up
to seven (7) calendar days may be granted for either party if written or verbal request is made
within forty-eight (48) hours of the original deadline. If the Union fails timely to seiect an
arbitrator, the grievance shall be deemed withdrawn.
Both parties shall reduce to writing their agreed positions with respect to facts, evidence,
and issues, and any disputed facts, evidence or issues. In discipline or discharge cases, no
transcripts or post-hearing briefs shall be used unless requested by the Union, and the decision
of the arbitrator shall be rendered within five (5) calendar days. In other cases, transcripts and
post-hearing briefs may be omitted by mutual agreement, and a time limit for decision may be set
by mutual agreement.
The arbitrator shall have no power to change this Agreement nor to impose any terms or
conditions the arbitrator might think the parties should have agreed upon. The arbitrator's power
is limited to finding the facts and to applying the terms of this Agreement to those facts. The
Union and the Authority shall equally share the expense and charges of the arbitrator. The
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